Explore Zujajah

Read. Reflect. Return.

Marriage

Hadith 3271a

(اس باب میں ان عورتوں کا بیان ہے جن کا نکاح مردوں پر حرام ہے)

In this book

Current reading

Marriage

(اس باب میں ان عورتوں کا بیان ہے جن کا نکاح مردوں پر حرام ہے)

Zujajat al-Masabih 3271aVolume 2

This language is not yet available for this narration.

Second printed occurrence of 3271 in volume 2; English supplied by Zujajah remaining Ahadith.docx. The typed Arabic prints this block separately.

Commentary and footnotes (2)

Note 1

To bring back his head

Regarding the statement, “To bring back his head”, the meaning is that, according to Abu Hanifah, a person who has intercourse with a woman who is permanently forbidden to him by kinship, such as his mother, maternal aunt or sister, after marrying her is not subject to the prescribed punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse. Sufyan al-Thawri also held this view, as recorded by Tahaawi in Sharh Ma‘ani al-Athar. According to Abu Yusuf and Muhammad, the two companions of Abu Hanifah, and the three other leading Imams, a person who has intercourse with a woman permanently forbidden to him by kinship after marrying her is subject to the prescribed punishment if he knows that the relationship is forbidden. The Khulasah states that this is the position on which the fatwa is based. However, the preferred position in the commentaries is the view of the Imam, so it is more appropriate to issue the fatwa according to it. Qasim stated in his book ‘al-Tashih wa al-Tarjih’ that Qahistani, quoting al-Mudmarat, reports that the fatwa follows the view of the two companions. A number of Shi‘a, along with some Sunnis who imitate them, have criticised Abu Hanifah over this issue. Some have spread the claim that, according to the Hanafi school, intercourse with permanently forbidden relatives and marrying them are lawful. Others have claimed that he contradicted authentic Hadiths. Such criticism from the Shi‘a is not surprising, for they have attacked people greater than Abu Hanifah, namely the Companions, without restraint. What is surprising is that people who imitate them in their cursing and criticism, and who belong to the Sunni community and even consider themselves followers of the Qur’an and Sunnah, have attacked the great Imam Abu Hanifah in this matter beyond all bounds. They have rejected his position in the harshest terms without understanding its underlying reasoning or carefully considering its evidence. I have written a treatise on this subject entitled al-Qawl al-Jazim bi-Suquṭ al-Hadd bi-Nikah al-Maharim (“The Decisive Statement on the Waiver of the Prescribed Punishment in the Case of Marriage to Permanently Forbidden Relatives”). In it, I have established his position through rational and transmitted evidence, supported his arguments with foundational principles, and answered the doubts raised by those who object, in a manner that refutes the obstinate. I have also discussed the relevant disagreements and subsidiary rulings, together with answers to the criticisms and objections. Anyone wishing to study the matter may consult this valuable treatise, which has no equal in its field of research. Let us now discuss some of the objections commonly circulated among ordinary people, together with their answers, as explained by the scholars. One objection is that waiving the prescribed punishment for intercourse with a permanently forbidden relative after marrying her necessarily means that the act is lawful and that the person who commits it bears no sin or blame. This objection is false in the view of every discerning person. The waiver of a prescribed punishment is one matter, while the lawfulness of an act is another. The fact that a prescribed punishment is waived does not make the act lawful. Indeed, prescribed punishments are averted when there are legal doubts, as established by reports and narrations transmitted by reliable authorities. For this reason, Abu Hanifah also ruled that a person who has intercourse with a permanently forbidden relative after marrying her is to receive a discretionary punishment and be disciplined severely, as explicitly stated in al-Hidayah and other works. Another objection is that, since the prescribed punishment is not imposed for intercourse with permanently forbidden relatives, no other punishment is required either. This is also false. A prescribed punishment does not mean every form of punitive consequence; rather, it refers to a punishment fixed by law as a right of Allah Almighty. Thus, saying that the prescribed punishment is waived in such a case means that the specific punishment prescribed for unlawful sexual intercourse—stoning or flogging—is not imposed because a legal doubt has arisen. It does not mean that all punishment is waived. Consider the consumption of blood, pork and similar forbidden things: although these are grave prohibitions, no prescribed punishment applies to them, yet discretionary punishment may still be imposed. A further objection is that Abu Hanifah contradicted the Qur’an in this matter because the Qur’an prohibits marriage to certain relatives and prescribes punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse. This objection is also rejected. Abu Hanifah did not declare intercourse with permanently forbidden relatives lawful, nor did he declare marriage to them lawful. Nor did he deny the prescribed punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse generally. Rather, he held that the prescribed punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse is waived when someone has intercourse with a permanently forbidden relative after marrying her, because the marriage creates a legal doubt concerning lawfulness, and prescribed punishments are averted where such doubts exist, as stated in the Prophet’s (peace be upon him) teachings. Nevertheless, he held that the ruler must impose a discretionary punishment appropriate to the offender's flagrant transgression. Another objection is that Abu Hanifah contradicted explicit Hadiths on this subject. Hakim recorded and graded authentic a report from Ibn Abbas, attributed to the Prophet (peace be upon him): “Whoever has intercourse with a permanently forbidden relative, kill him.” Tirmidhi also narrated a similar report through a weak chain, and Ibn Majah recorded it with the additional wording, “Whoever has intercourse with an animal, kill him and kill the animal.” Abd al-Razzaq, Ibn Abi Shaybah, Hakim, who graded it authentic, and Bayhaqi narrated from al-Bara that he said, “I met my uncle carrying a banner and asked him where he was going. He said, ‘The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) sent me to a man who had married his father's wife after his father's death and ordered me to strike his neck and take his property.’” Tahaawi, Abu Dawud and others also recorded a similar report. The answer is that the killing, beheading or confiscation of property mentioned in these reports is not the prescribed punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse. This is evident because the general and unrestricted wording of these reports would require the killing of everyone who has intercourse with a permanently forbidden relative, whereas stoning is unanimously restricted to a person who has previously been in a valid marriage. Some narrations also command killing a person merely for marrying a permanently forbidden relative, even though marriage itself is not classified as unlawful sexual intercourse by agreement. Other narrations command the confiscation of property, which is likewise not a prescribed punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse by agreement. The prescribed punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse is, by agreement, stoning or flogging, with or without banishment. The killing ordered in these Hadiths is plainly not flogging, nor is it stoning, since stoning does not consist of striking the neck and severing the head. In short, the action ordered by the Prophet (peace be upon him) was a form of discretionary punishment and public discipline. Abu Hanifah does not deny this. His position is only that the prescribed punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse is waived for a person who has married a permanently forbidden relative. He does not say that discretionary punishment is also waived. Rather, according to him, the ruler must impose an appropriate discretionary punishment on such a wicked offender, which may include confiscation of property, execution or another suitable measure, according to the gravity of his transgression and the ruler's judgement. If someone objects that intercourse with a permanently forbidden relative without marriage unanimously requires the prescribed punishment, so how can it fail to require that punishment after marriage, when the latter is an additional outrage, the answer is that this is not unreasonable. Intercourse without marriage involves no such legal doubt, whereas the marriage contract creates a doubt. If someone then argues that marriage to a permanently forbidden relative is unquestionably invalid, so how can it create a legal doubt, the answer is that there is no contradiction. A legal doubt is something that resembles a legally established state without actually being established. If someone says that this is a weak doubt, the response is that the Hadith, “Avert prescribed punishments when there are doubts”, does not distinguish between different kinds of doubt. Thus, even the weak doubt created by the existence of a marriage contract is relevant. A comparable case is reported by Malik, Shafi‘i and others: Umar ibn al-Khattab punished a man who married a woman during the waiting period following her previous husband's divorce. He also punished the woman and separated them. Although marriage during the waiting period is forbidden by an explicit Qur’anic ruling and is legally invalid, the contract nevertheless created a doubt, so Umar waived the prescribed punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse and punished them as a matter of public discipline. If someone asks that, were the marriage contract to create a legal doubt, the waiting period should become obligatory and the child's lineage should be established in such a marriage, the answer is that some of our scholars rejected the claim that the waiting period is not obligatory or that lineage cannot be established. They based this on the fact that the contract creates a doubt concerning the lawfulness of the relationship, and lineage is established where there is a doubt concerning the legal status of the relationship, as mentioned by al-Ayni and others. Even if we accept the view of some scholars that neither the waiting period is obligatory nor lineage is established, we would say that the obligation of the waiting period and the establishment of lineage depend on the relationship being lawful in some respect. In this case, there is no lawfulness whatsoever in the person himself, meaning the permanently forbidden relative. Here, lawfulness means that the person engaging in intercourse is in a position in which he would not be blameworthy for doing so. The waiver of the prescribed punishment, however, arises simply because a doubt has appeared through the existence of something that ordinarily makes intercourse lawful, namely a marriage contract, which is established for the purpose of making marital intimacy lawful, even if the doubt is weak. It is therefore clear that the prescribed punishment is waived because of the marriage contract, even if the person says that he knew the act was forbidden. This is explicitly stated in al-Hidayah. The discussion is found in Umdat al-Ri‘ayah, with additional material from al-Durr al-Mukhtar.

Note 1

قوله

(۱) قوله : آتية برأسه : أي لا يُحد من وطئ محرمة من محارمه كالأم والخالة والأخت بعد ما نكحها، هذا عند أبي حنيفة . وبه قال سفيان الثوري، كما أخرجه الطحاوي في شرح معاني الآثار»، وعندهما وعند الأئمة الثلاثة يُحد الواطي بالمحارم بعد النكاح إذا كان عالما بالحرمة، وعليه الفتوى خلاصة»، لكن المرجح في جميع الشروح قول الإمام فكان الفتوى عليه أولى. قال قاسم في تصحيحه: لكن في القهستاني» عن «المضمرات»: على قولهما الفتوى، وهذه المسألة قد طعن بها جمع من الشيعة ومن يتشبه بهم من أهل السنة على أبي حنيفة، وشهر بعضهم أن وطء المحارم ونكاحهن حلال عند الحنفية. ومنهم من قال: إنه خالف فيه الأحاديث الصحيحة، ولا عجب من الشيعة؛ فإنهم قد فعنوا من غير مبالاة على أكبر من أبي حنيفة يعني الصحابة، فما بالك بأبي حنيفة. إنما العجب ممن تشبه بهم في اللعن والطعن، وسكل مسلكهم في الهمز واللمز، وهم من أهل السنة، بل عدو أنفسهم من متبعي الكتاب والسنة، فطعنوا على الإمام الهمام أبي حنيفة في هذه المسألة طعنا تجاوزا عن الحد، وردوا عليه بأقبح الرد من غير فهم مداركه، والتأمل في دلائله، وقد الفت في هذه المسالة رسالة سميتهما القول الجازم بسقوط الحد بنكاح المحارم شيدت فيها مذهبه بالمعقول والمنقول، وأيدت فيها كلامه بالأصول ودفعت تشكيكات المشكيكين على وجه يقصم ظهور المتعنتين. وذكرت ما يتعلق بها من الخلاف والفروع مع الجواب عن المطاعن والجروح. فإن شئت الاطلاع فارجع غليها؛ فإنها نفيسة في بابها، لا نظير لها في أبحاثها ولنذكر نبذا من المطاعن المشهورة فيما بين العوام مع الجواب عنها، على ما تفيه الأعلام. فاعلم أن من جملة مطاعنهم أن إسقاط الحد بوطء المحارم بعد نكاحهن مستلزم؛ لحل هذا الفعل الشنيع وعدم لزوم إثم وملامة على مرتكب هذا القبيح. وهذا طعن باطل عند كل فاضل؛ فإن سقوط الحد أمر آخر، وحل الفعل أمر آخر، ولا يلزم من سقوط الحد في وطء حله. كيف فإن الحد يدرأ بالشبهات، على ما ثبت ذلك بالأخبار والآثار الثابتة برواية الثقات، ولذا حكم أبو حنيفة أيضًا في وطء المحارم بعد نكاحهن بأنه يعزر ، ويوجع عقوبة، كما صرح به في «الهداية» وغيرها. ومنها قولهم: لما لم يجب الحد بوطء المحارم دل ذلك على أنه لا يجب فيه شيء من العقوبة، وهذا قول باطل، فإن الحد ليس عبارة عن كل جزاء عقوبة، بل هو عبارة عن عقوبة مقدرة تجب حقا لله تعالى. فمعنى قولهم: يسقط الحد بوطء على كذا وكذا أنه لا يجب عليه الجزاء المقدر للزاني، وهو الرجم أو الجلد؛ العروض شبهة أسقطته، لا أنه لا يجب شيء من العقوبة ألا ترى إلى أن شرب الدم وأكل الخنزير ونحوهما من المحرمات مع كونها أشد من الزنا لا حد فيها مع وجوب التعزير فيها. ومنها أن أبا حنيفة خالف كتاب الله في هذه المسألة؛ فإن الكتاب حكم بحرمة نكاح المحرمات وحكم بوجوب الحد وعلى من زنى، وهو طعن مردود؛ لأن أبا حنيفة لم يقل بحل وطء المحارم أو بحل نكاحهن، ولم يقل بعدم وجوب الحد على الزاني حتى يكون مخالفًا لكتاب الله، بل قال بسقوط حد الزنا عن واطئ المحارم بعد نكاحهن؛ لكون النكاح شبهة في الحل والحدود تدرأ بالشبهات بنص النبي ، ومع ذلك قال بوجوب التعزير حسب ما يراه الإمام على ذلك التمرد الخبيث الذي يطأ محارمه بعد النكاح. ومنها قولهم: إن أبا حنيفة خالف في هذا الباب الأحاديث الصريحة. فأخرج الحاكم وصححه من حديث ابن عباس مرفوعا: من وقع على ذات محرم فاقتلوه، ومثله رواه الترمذي بسند ضعيف وابن ماجه مع زيادة ومن وقع على بهيمة فاقتلوه واقتلوا البهيمة، وأخرج عبد الرزاق وابن أبي شيبة والحاكم وصححه والبيهقي عن البراء: قال: لقبت خالي ومعه الراية، فقلت: أين تريد؟ فقال: بعثني رسول الله الله إلى رجل تزوج امرأة أبيه من بعده، فأمرني أن أضرب عنقه وآخذ ماله. ومثله أخرجه الطحاوي وأبو داود وغيرهما، والجواب عنه: أن القتل أو ضرب العنق أو أخذ المال المذكور في هذه الروايات ليس حدا للزنا، يَدلُّ عليه أنها تدل بعمومه وإطلاقها على وجوب قتل كل من وقع على محرم مع أن الرجم مختص بالمحصن إجماعًا، وأيضًا ورد في بعض الروايات القتل بتزوج ذات محرم مع أن التزوج ليس بزنا اتفاقا. وأيضًا ورد في بعضها الأمر بأخذ المال، وهو ليس جزاءًا للزنا اتفاقا. وأيضا حد الزنا إنما هو الرجم والجلد مع التغريب أو بدونه اتفاقا. والقتل المأمور به في هذه الأحاديث هو غير الجلد، وهو ظاهر، وغير الرجم؛ لأن الرجم لا يكون بضرب العنق وقطع الرأس. وبالجملة فهذا الذي أمره به النبي ﷺ إنما هو تعزير وسياسة وهذا مما لا ينكره أبو حنيفة، إنما يقول بسقوط حد الزنا عمن نكح بمحرم، ولا لعدم وجوب تعزير عليه، بل يجب عنده على الإمام أن يقيم على مثل هذا الخبيث تعزيرا حسب ما يراه على حسب تمرده بأخذ المال أو ضرب العنق أو نحو ذلك. فإن قلت: الوطء بالمحارم بدون النكاح موجب للحد اتفاقا، فكيف لا يوجبه بعد النكاح، وهو شناعة أخرى. قلت: هذا ليس بمستبعد عند والعقل؛ فإن الوطء بدون النكاح لا شبهة فيه، والنكاح يورث شبهة. فإن قلت: النكاح بالمحارم فاسد قطعا، فكيف يورث شبهة ؟ قلت: لا استبعاد في ذلك؛ فإن الشبهة عبارة عما يشبه الثابت، فليس بثابت. فإن قلت: هذه شبهة ركيكة ؟ قلت: هب ولكن حديث: ادرؤوا الحدود بالشبهات لم يفرق بين شبهة وشبهة، فشبهة كونه منكوحة وإن كات ضعيفة. ونظيره ما روى مالك والشافعي وغيرهما أن عمر بن الخطاب ضرب الذي نكح امرأة في عدتها من طلاق زوجها الأول، وضربها أيضًا، وفرق بينهما مع أن النكاح في العدة حرام بنص الكتاب وفاسد شرعًا، لكن لما أورث ذلك شبهة أسقط عمر بن الخطاب عنهما حد الزنا وضربهما سياسة. فإن قلت: لو كانت الشبهة بالعقد ثابتة لوجبت العدة، وثبت النسب في نكاح المحارم؟ قلت: منع بعض أصحابنا عدم وجوب العدة وعدم ثبوت النسب بناءً على أن العقد يورث شبهة في حل المحل، وفي شبهة المحل يثبت النسب، كما ذكره العيني وغيره. ولو سلم عدم وجوب العدة وعدم ثبوت النسب، كما هو رأي بعض المشايخ. نقول: مبنى وجوب العدة وثبوت النسب على ثبوت حل المحل، ولو من وجه، وههنا لا حل للمحل : أي المحارم أصلا، والمراد بالحل أن يكون الواطئ على حال لا يلام بالوطء. وأما سقوط الحد فهو لمجرد عروض شبهة بوجود ما يحلل الوطء، وهو النكاحالموضوع الحل الاستمتاع، ولو كانت شبهة ركيكة. وبهذا يعلم أن الحد يسقط بالنكاح مطلقا، وإن قال: علمت أنه حرام. صرح به في «الهداية». كذا في عمدة الرعاية مع زيادة من الدر المختار».