Chapter: The Waiting Period (‘Iddah)

(1) The statement: And for divorced women—This verse clarifies the maintenance of divorced women, as provision refers to maintenance, which is the preferred view of the author of Al-Madarak. The meaning of the verse is that a divorced woman is entitled to maintenance from her husband as long as she is observing her waiting period, whether the divorce is revocable, irrevocable, or otherwise. This verse’s ruling remains in effect and is not abrogated by consensus. There is a difference of opinion regarding the irrevocably divorced woman, which will be discussed in this chapter, God willing. This is derived from At-Tafsir Al-Ahmadiyya.

(2) The statement: Do not expel them—This means it is not permissible to expel a divorced woman observing her waiting period from her husband’s house, nor for her to leave. Do not expel them means, O husbands, do not remove them from their homes at the time of separation until their waiting period ends. Nor should they leave [At-Talaq: 1] means they should not leave voluntarily except if they commit a clear immorality [At-Talaq: 1], i.e., an evident sinful act that warrants a prescribed punishment, such as adultery or theft, in which case they may be expelled for that reason, or if she harms the household with obscenity or immorality, it is permissible to expel her as she is considered rebellious (nashiz). This exception applies to both forms of expulsion. In summary, the verse proves her right to housing and her obligation to remain in the place of separation. This is summarized from At-Tafsir Al-Ahmadiyya.

(3) The statement: House them—This clarifies that providing housing is obligatory for a divorced woman observing her waiting period. House them means, O men, provide them a place where you dwell [At-Talaq: 6], i.e., a place from your residence according to your means [At-Talaq: 6], i.e., within your capacity. And do not harm them [At-Talaq: 6] in housing or maintenance to oppress them in their livelihood and force them to leave. The first phrase indicates partial provision, and the second clarifies it, as stated by the authors of Al-Kashshaf and Al-Madarak. Fakhr Al-Islam mentioned in Aqsam As-Sunnah that it means: Spend on them according to your means, indicating both housing and maintenance. This is from At-Tafsir Al-Ahmadiyya.

(4) The statement: Menstrual periods—There is disagreement regarding the menstrual periods mentioned in the verse, whether they refer to periods of purity or menstruation. The apparent meaning of the Prophet’s (ﷺ) saying: She observes her waiting period with three menstruations, and his saying: She remains during her menstrual periods, and his saying: Her waiting period is two menstruations, and the narrations mentioned in the book, indicate that the menstrual periods are menstruations. This is the view of Abu Hanifah. This is derived from Nayl Al-Awtar.

(2) The statement: She is entitled to housing and maintenance—Scholars differed regarding whether an irrevocably divorced non-pregnant woman is entitled to maintenance and housing. Umar ibn Al-Khattab, Abu Hanifah, and others said: Maintenance and housing are obligatory for a woman observing her waiting period due to divorce, whether revocable or irrevocable, pregnant or not, and whether divorced once or thrice, as long as she is in the waiting period. Ibn Abbas, Ahmad, and others said: A non-pregnant irrevocably divorced woman has no right to housing or maintenance. Malik, Shafi’i, and others said: She is entitled to housing but not maintenance. In summary, if a woman is observing her waiting period from a valid marriage due to divorce, if the divorce is revocable, she is entitled to maintenance and housing without dispute, as the marriage remains intact, and her state after divorce is like before it. If the divorce is three times or irrevocable, she is entitled to maintenance and housing if pregnant, by consensus, based on His saying: And if they are pregnant, then spend on them until they give birth [At-Talaq: 6]. If she is non-pregnant, she is entitled to maintenance and housing according to our scholars. Shafi’i said: She is entitled to housing but not maintenance. Ahmad said: Neither maintenance nor housing. They argued with His saying: And if they are pregnant, then spend on them until they give birth [At-Talaq: 6], specifying spending for the pregnant, so if spending were obligatory for the non-pregnant, the specification would be void. It is narrated from Fatimah bint Qais that she said: My husband divorced me thrice, and the Prophet (ﷺ) did not grant me maintenance or housing, as maintenance is due to ownership, which ceases with three divorces or irrevocable divorce. Shafi’i said: The obligation of housing for the pregnant is known by text, unlike the irrevocably divorced. Our evidence is His saying: House them where you dwell, according to your means [At-Talaq: 6], and in the recitation of Abdullah ibn Mas’ud: House them where you dwell and spend on them according to your means. There is no difference between the recitations, but one explains the other, like His saying: And the male thief and the female thief, cut off their hands [Al-Ma’idah: 38], and Ibn Mas’ud’s recitation: Their right hands, which is not a difference in recitation but an explanation of the apparent recitation. Similarly, the command to provide housing implies spending, as if she is confined and prohibited from leaving, she cannot earn maintenance. If her maintenance were not on the husband and she had no wealth, she would perish or face hardship, which is impermissible. His saying: And for divorced women is a provision according to what is acceptable [Al-Baqarah: 241], and His saying: And do not harm them [At-Talaq: 6], and His saying: Let the man of means spend according to his means, and the one whose provision is restricted, let him spend from what Allah has given him [At-Talaq: 7], without distinguishing between before and after divorce during the waiting period. Maintenance was obligatory before divorce because she was confined from leaving and appearing due to the husband’s right. This confinement persists after divorce during the waiting period, reinforced by the right of the Shariah, as before divorce, the confinement was the husband’s right for exclusivity, but after divorce, it is attached to the Shariah’s right, so she is not permitted to leave even if the husband allows it. Since maintenance was obligatory due to confinement before its reinforcement, it is more fittingly obligatory after reinforcement. The verse commands spending on the pregnant, which neither negates nor mandates spending on the non-pregnant, leaving it silent and dependent on evidence, and the evidence for obligation is what we mentioned. As for Fatimah bint Qais’s hadith, Umar rejected it, as it is narrated that when she narrated that the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) did not grant her housing or maintenance, Umar said: We will not abandon the Book of our Lord or the Sunnah of our Prophet for the saying of a woman, whether she spoke the truth or lied. In some narrations: We will not abandon the Book of our Lord and the Sunnah of our Prophet or take the saying of a woman who forgot or was mistaken, as I heard the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) say: She is entitled to housing and maintenance. Umar’s statement: We will not abandon the Book of our Lord may refer to His saying: House them where you dwell [At-Talaq: 7] and spend on them according to your means, following Ibn Mas’ud’s recitation. It may also refer to His saying: Let the man of means spend according to his means [At-Talaq: 7]. It may also mean, regarding housing specifically, His saying: House them where you dwell, according to your means [At-Talaq: 6], as it is recited, and by the Sunnah of our Prophet, what is narrated that he said: I heard the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) say: She is entitled to housing and maintenance. It is possible that Umar had a recitation whose text was lifted but whose ruling remained, so by We will not abandon the Book of our Lord, he meant that verse, as narrated from him regarding adultery, that they used to recite in Surah Al-Ahzab: The elderly man and woman, if they commit adultery, stone them as a deterrent from Allah, and Allah is Mighty, Wise, then its recitation was lifted, but its ruling remained, as is the case here. It is narrated that her husband, Usamah ibn Zayd, when he heard her narrate that, threw whatever was in his hand at her. It is narrated from Aishah that she said to her: You have confused people with this hadith. The least degree of the companions’ rejection of a narrator’s hadith warrants questioning it. It has been said in its interpretation that she was harsh with her in-laws, so the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) moved her to the house of Ibn Umm Maktum and did not grant her maintenance or housing because she became like a rebellious woman, as the reason for her leaving was from her. We say the same for a woman who leaves her husband’s house during her waiting period or causes a reason warranting expulsion: she is not entitled to maintenance as long as she is in a house other than her husband’s. It is also said that her husband was absent, so no ruling was made for maintenance or housing against him in his absence, as it is not permissible to rule against an absent person without a present opponent. If it is said: It is narrated that her husband went to Yemen and had appointed his brother, the response is: He appointed him for her divorce or to deliver maintenance, not for litigation. Abu Hanifah did not rely on or act upon Fatimah bint Qais’s hadith because it is questioned and not accepted for several reasons, including that the condition for accepting a single narrator’s report is the absence of criticism by the predecessors, lack of inconsistency, and no opposing report that must be prioritized. This hadith is contrary to all these conditions. As for the predecessors’ criticism, major companions criticized it, as we will mention, despite it not being their custom to criticize due to the narrator being a woman or a Bedouin. Umar said: We will not abandon the Book of our Lord or the Sunnah of our Prophet for the saying of a woman; we do not know if she remembered or forgot. She is entitled to housing and maintenance, as Allah, the Exalted, said: Do not expel them from their homes, nor should they leave, except if they commit a clear immorality [At-Talaq: 1]. He stated that the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) is that she is entitled to housing and maintenance. There is no doubt that a companion’s statement: It is from the Sunnah is elevated. How much more so when the speaker is Umar? In what At-Tahawi and Ad-Daraqutni narrated, there is the addition of his saying: I heard the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) say: For a woman divorced three times, maintenance and housing. At most, her narration conflicts, so which narration should be prioritized? Sa’id ibn Mansur narrated: Mu’awiyah narrated from Al-A’mash, from Ibrahim, that Umar, when Fatimah’s hadith was mentioned, said: We will not alter our religion based on a woman’s testimony. This is evidence that the known religion was the obligation of maintenance and housing, so Fatimah’s hadith is considered an anomaly. A trustworthy narrator’s anomalous report is not accepted. This is clarified by what is in Muslim from Marwan’s saying: We will adhere to the protection we found people upon, and the people then were the companions, which is tantamount to reporting the companions’ consensus and describing it as protection. In the Sahihayn, from Urwah, he said to Aishah: Do you not see that so-and-so, daughter of Al-Hakam, was irrevocably divorced by her husband and left? She said: What a bad thing she did. I said: Have you not heard Fatimah’s saying? She said: There is no good in that or in mentioning it. This is the utmost rejection, as she completely negated the ruling. Aishah was the most knowledgeable about women’s affairs, as they would come to her house and seek her rulings, and this was frequent. In Sahih Al-Bukhari, from Aishah, she said to Fatimah: Do you not fear Allah? Meaning her saying: No housing or maintenance. The opposition and criticism have been clarified. As for the inconsistency, some narrations state: He divorced her while absent; others: He divorced her then traveled; others: She went to the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) and asked him; others: Khalid ibn Al-Walid went with a group and asked; some narrations name the husband Abu Amr ibn Hafs; others: Abu Ja’far ibn Al-Mughirah. Inconsistency warrants weakening the hadith, as is known in hadith science. Those who rejected the hadith include Zayd ibn Thabit, Marwan ibn Al-Hakam, and among the successors, with Ibn Al-Musayyib, Shurayh, Ash-Sha’bi, Al-Hasan, Al-Aswad ibn Yazid, and after them, Ath-Thawri, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and many who followed them. If it is said: He said to her: You have no maintenance or housing, we say: Firstly, we are not required to explain the excuse for what she narrated, but what we mentioned suffices, that it is anomalous, contrary to what people were upon and Umar’s narration, whether it is the same or not. However, addressing it is good to uphold the validity of her narration. We say: The lack of housing was for what was heard, and the lack of maintenance was because her husband was absent and left no wealth with anyone except the barley he sent her. She demanded from his family, as in Muslim, that he divorced her thrice then went to Yemen, and his family said: You have no maintenance. Thus, he said to her: You have no maintenance or housing, assuming its authenticity, because he left no wealth with anyone, and nothing is obligatory on his family, so you have no maintenance from anyone by necessity. She did not understand his intent and narrated the negation of maintenance absolutely, leading to people’s rejection of her. Additionally, Amir Al-Mu’minin Umar criticized the hadith regarding the narrator’s retention and accuracy, saying: She remembered or forgot, which is a sufficient example. As for our principles in criticizing, authenticating, weakening, and verifying, he is higher in our view than Ali ibn Al-Madini, Yahya ibn Sa’id, Yahya Al-Qattan, Abu Hatim, Al-Bukhari, and others. The narration also explicitly contradicts the Quran in His saying: House them where you dwell, according to your means [At-Talaq: 6] and Do not expel them from their homes, nor should they leave [At-Talaq: 1]. The Quran is definitive in its generality and specificity, as established in its principles, and a single narrator’s report does not specify it, as the definitive is not opposed by the probable. Additionally, what Ibrahim narrated from Umar, that he said: I heard the Prophet (ﷺ) say: She is entitled to housing and maintenance. Even if Ibrahim did not hear Umar, his mursal narrations are authentic and accepted, as narrated from Tahdhib At-Tahdhib from a group of scholars. This is derived from Al-Mabsut, Al-Bada’i, Fath Al-Qadir, and Tansiq An-Nizam.

(1) The statement: Stay in your house—This hadith is used as evidence that a woman whose husband has died observes her waiting period in the house where she received news of her husband’s death and does not leave it for another. This is the view of a group of companions, successors, and those after them, including Malik, Abu Hanifah, Shafi’i, their followers, Al-Awza’i, Ishaq, and Abu Ubaid. Ibn Abd Al-Barr said: A group of jurists from the Hijaz, Sham, Iraq, and Egypt upheld the hadith of Al-Furay’ah, and none of them criticized it. It is narrated that leaving is permissible for a valid reason from a group, including Umar, Zayd ibn Thabit, Ibn Umar, Ibn Mas’ud, and others. If you say: This hadith explicitly indicates that she is not permitted to leave even with an excuse, as the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) did not consider her excuse and did not permit her to leave despite it, I say: There is a difference between relocating and leaving. The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) did not permit her to relocate from the place where she received news of her husband’s death. As for leaving during the day and spending the night there, the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) did not prohibit it, and permission for it is narrated from the companions. Thus, it is permissible for her to leave during the day and spend the night in her house. This is from Bazl Al-Majhud.

(2) The statement: A divorced woman does not leave her house—This means the waiting period for an irrevocably or revocably divorced woman, or one whose husband has died, is in her husband’s house. For an irrevocably or revocably divorced woman, it is not permissible to leave day or night. A woman whose husband has died may leave during the day. The prohibition of a divorced woman leaving is based on His saying: Do not expel them from their homes, nor should they leave, except if they commit a clear immorality [At-Talaq: 1]. The immorality is the act of leaving itself, as Al-Nakha’i said. Ibn Mas’ud said: It is adultery, so they leave for the prescribed punishment. Ibn Abbas said: It is her rebellion or abusive speech. As for a woman whose husband has died leaving during the day, it is because she has no maintenance, so she needs to leave during the day for her livelihood, unlike a divorced woman, as her maintenance is provided by her husband. This is from Al-Hidayah and its commentary Al-Binayah. Those who obligated staying in the husband’s house for a woman whose husband died include Umar, Uthman, Ibn Mas’ud, Ibn Umar, Umm Salamah, Sa’id ibn Al-Musayyib, Al-Qasim, Al-Awza’i, Malik, Shafi’i, Ahmad, Ishaq ibn Rahwayh, and Abu Ubaidah. Al-Qari used as evidence His saying: Those who die and leave wives behind, a bequest for their wives of provision for a year without expulsion [Al-Baqarah: 240], indicating she does not leave her husband’s house. When the period of a year was abrogated to four months and ten days, and the bequest was abrogated, the prohibition on leaving remained. Az-Zurqani mentioned that Al-Layth, Malik, and a group said a divorced woman may also leave during the day, based on Jabir’s hadith in Muslim: My aunt was divorced and wanted to harvest her palm trees, and a man forbade her from leaving, but the Prophet (ﷺ) ordered her, saying: Yes, harvest your palm trees, for perhaps you will give charity or do good. The response is that it is a specific incident with no general application. This is from At-Ta’liq Al-Mumajjad. Thus, it is said in Ad-Durr Al-Mukhtar: A woman observing a revocable or irrevocable waiting period, regardless of the type of separation, does not leave, as per Az-Zahiriyyah. If she is divorced by mutual agreement (khul‘) on maintenance for her waiting period, in the most correct view, or on housing, she must rent her husband’s house, as per Mi’raj.

(1) The statement: She gave birth after her husband’s death—This means the waiting period for a pregnant woman is until she gives birth, whether in a waiting period due to divorce, annulment, or death, based on His saying: And for those who are pregnant, their term is until they give birth [At-Talaq: 4]. This is the view of Ibn Mas’ud and Umar. Ali said: Her waiting period is the longer of the two terms, as the texts conflict: some mandate waiting for three menstrual periods, as in Surah Al-Baqarah; some four months and ten days, also in it; and some the birth, as in Surah At-Talaq. We said the longer term is obligatory for caution. The response is that the verse about pregnancy is later, so the others are abrogated or specified by it. Ibn Mas’ud said: The short Surah An-Nisa (At-Talaq) was revealed after four months and ten days, narrated by Abu Dawud, An-Nasa’i, and Ibn Majah, meaning His saying: And for those who are pregnant [At-Talaq: 4] is later than His saying: They shall wait [Al-Baqarah: 228], abrogating it regarding what the two verses encompass, which is a pregnant woman whose husband died. Those who are pregnant does not include a non-pregnant woman whose husband died, and Those who die [Al-Baqarah: 234], i.e., the wives of those who die, does not include a pregnant divorced woman. He said: Whoever wishes, I will challenge him. Thus, And for those who are pregnant [At-Talaq: 4], regarding establishing the waiting period for a pregnant divorced woman, is not abrogating, as it does not fall under the verse of Al-Baqarah. Those who die [Al-Baqarah: 234], regarding mandating the waiting period for a non-pregnant woman whose husband died, is not abrogated, as it does not fall under the verse of At-Talaq. Abrogation applies only to what falls under both verses, which is a pregnant woman whose husband died, so her waiting period is by giving birth, not by months. Thus, Al-Shawkani said: The majority of scholars from the predecessors and jurists in the cities held that a pregnant woman whose husband dies completes her waiting period by giving birth.

(1) The statement: The Messenger of Allah said: No—There is agreement that a woman whose husband died must observe mourning during her waiting period. For an irrevocably divorced woman, i.e., one by mutual agreement or divorced three times or with an irrevocable divorce, she must observe mourning during her waiting period according to us. Shafi’i said: She does not observe mourning, as the text pertains to a woman whose husband died, and mourning for her is to express sorrow for the husband’s death, who was faithful to her until death separated them, which is not present for a divorced woman, as her husband neglected her and preferred another, so she should show joy at being free from him, not sorrow. Our view is that it is obligatory to express sorrow for the loss of the blessing of marriage, which protected her chastity and sufficed her needs. Irrevocable divorce is more final than death, such that she could wash him when dead before irrevocability, but not after. It is not obligatory for a man, despite losing the blessing of marriage, because mourning follows the waiting period, and thus it is not permissible for her to mourn for anyone other than the husband, like a child, due to the absence of a waiting period. Our evidence is also what is narrated that he prohibited a woman observing her waiting period from kohl, oil, and dyeing with henna, narrated by An-Nasa’i, supported by what At-Tahawi narrated from Ibrahim An-Nakha’i. The description of mourning is that she does not use perfume, oil, wear jewelry, or clothing dyed with saffron or turmeric, as the purpose of these is adornment, which is contrary to expressing sorrow, and they are means of attracting men, which she is prohibited from during her waiting period. She does not apply kohl for adornment either, but if her eyes are afflicted, there is no harm in applying black kohl, as it is narrated that a woman whose husband died sought permission from the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) to apply kohl initially, and he permitted her. When she reached the door, he called her back, saying: One of you in the pre-Islamic era… The interpretation is that he initially thought she did not intend adornment and permitted her, then realized she intended adornment and prohibited her. For a woman with a revocable divorce, there is no harm in using perfume or adorning with whatever clothing she wishes, as the blessing and permissibility of marriage have not ceased, and the husband is encouraged to take her back, and adornment encourages him to do so, so she is also encouraged to do it. This is summarized from Al-Mabsut.

(2) The statement: Except for an unavoidable need—Thus, it is said in Al-Kanz: A woman observing mourning for irrevocable divorce or death must abstain from adornment, perfume, kohl, and oil except with an excuse. In Al-Marqah: Ahmad said: It is not permissible for a woman whose husband died to apply antimony kohl, whether for an eye affliction or otherwise. According to us and Malik, it is permissible to apply it for an affliction. Shafi’i said: She applies kohl for an affliction at night and wipes it off during the day. It is said in Radd Al-Muhtar: Some Shafi’is restricted applying kohl for an excuse to nighttime, then removing it during the day, as narrated in the hadith. I have not seen any of our scholars restrict it thus, and it seems understood from the principle that necessity is limited to its extent. If the night or day suffices, she restricts it to the night and does not reverse it, as the night conceals the adornment of kohl, which is the interpretation of the hadith. Allah, the Exalted, knows best.

(3) The statement: From Ibrahim—It is said in Al-Inayah: Ibrahim lived in the era of the companions and competed with them in issuing rulings, so it is permissible to follow him.

(4) The statement: He prohibited a woman observing her waiting period—It is said in Fath Al-Qadir: We said there is a text in the disputed matter, which is this hadith, mentioned by As-Saruji, attributed to An-Nasa’i, and it is possible it is in some of his books.

(1) The statement: It is not permissible for a woman—Al-Shawkani said: The Hanafis and some Malikis used its implication, saying: Mourning is not obligatory for a minor who believes in Allah and the Last Day. It is said in Nayl Al-Awtar: The Hanafis and some Malikis used it as evidence that mourning is not obligatory for a non-Muslim woman.

(2) The statement: To mourn for a deceased person beyond three nights—Thus, it is said in Ad-Durr Al-Mukhtar: Mourning for a relative is permissible for only three days, and the husband may prohibit it, as adornment is his right, as per Fath. It is said in Radd Al-Muhtar: The hadith indicates its permissibility for three days and not beyond, and Muhammad’s unrestricted statement in An-Nawadir about impermissibility is interpreted accordingly, as clarified by Fath. In Al-Bahr from At-Tatarkhaniyya: It is recommended for her to avoid it entirely. The wording of Fath: If she wishes to mourn for a relative for three days and has a husband, he may prohibit her, as adornment is his right, such that he may discipline her for abandoning it if she refuses while he desires it. This mourning is permissible for her, not obligatory, and it affects his right. Its endorsement in Al-Bahr—It is said in An-Nahr: The hadith implies he has no such right, and what is mentioned in Shafi’i books is that he has it. Our principles do not oppose it, so the permissibility in the hadith is interpreted as applying when the husband does not prohibit her, as every permissibility established for something is restricted by the absence of a preventer, otherwise it is not permissible, as here. Since the discussion in Fath falls under their saying that he may discipline her for abandoning adornment, it is consistent with the transmitted, and those after him endorsed it, so the commentator affirmed it. The discussion is not only for the author of An-Nahr, so understand.

(3) The statement: Nor ‘asb clothing—This means the description of mourning is that she does not use perfume, oil, wear jewelry, clothing dyed with saffron or turmeric, ‘asb clothing, or silk for adornment. It is said: It is Yemeni striped fabric; the correct view is that it is fine linen. In An-Nawadir from Abu Yusuf: There is no harm in her wearing fine linen or red silk. The interpretation is that if she wears it without intending adornment, it is as in the agreed-upon hadith. If worn for adornment, it is disliked, as in Al-Bayhaqi’s hadith. This is summarized from Al-Mabsut. Thus, the scholars differed: according to us, she does not wear ‘asb. Shafi’i permitted its fine and coarse types. We interpreted in the agreed-upon hadith that it is Yemeni clothing with white and black, and wearing black is permissible according to the four imams. This is derived from Fath Al-Qadir.

(4) The statement: When she becomes pure—An-Nawawi said: Qust and azfar are two well-known types of incense, not intended for perfume, and they are permitted to remove odor, not for perfuming. This is from Umdat Al-Qari.

(1) The statement: He said, "With sidr": Meaning, comb with sidr, using a wide-toothed comb, not a narrow one, as mentioned in Al-Mabsut. The three Imams mentioned it generally, and it is stated in the Hadith without specification. Using a narrow comb implies adornment, which is prohibited for her, while a wide comb prevents harm, which is not prohibited. She may even need a narrow comb to remove pests. However, anything intended for adornment is not permissible, as restricted in Al-Jawhara to combing for a necessity. They unanimously prohibited perfumed oils for adornment, though the two Imams and the Zahiriyyah permitted it. [Fath Al-Qadir and Radd Al-Muhtar, excerpted from them]

(2) The statement: She should not wear saffron-colored garments, etc.: It is stated in Ad-Durr Al-Mukhtar: A mature Muslim woman, even if a slave, who is observing her waiting period due to divorce or death, must refrain from adornment, including jewelry, silk, perfume, oil (even without perfume, like pure oil), kohl, henna, and wearing saffron or red-colored garments or those dyed with safflower or wars, except for a necessity.

(1) The statement: They allowed him to take her back until she performs ghusl after her third menstruation: The basis for the chapter on the waiting period of divorce is Allah’s statement: And divorced women shall wait for three quru’ [Al-Baqarah: 228]. There was disagreement from the time of the companions and those after them regarding the meaning of quru’ in the verse, as quru’ (with dammah) is the plural of qar’ (with fathah), a term that can refer to either menstruation or purity. Some interpreted qar’ as purity, holding that the waiting period is three periods of purity, which is the view of Ash-Shafi’i. Our scholars, following many companions, including the Rightly Guided Caliphs, held that qar’ refers to menstruation. The practical difference appears when a woman is divorced during a period of purity and then experiences three menstrual cycles. According to Ash-Shafi’i, her waiting period ends upon entering the third menstruation, while according to us, it ends when the blood of the third menstruation ceases. Thus, she cannot marry another man during the third menstruation according to our view, contrary to his. Our position is supported by several points, including the Hadith: "The divorce of a slave woman is two, and her quru’ are two menstrual cycles," narrated by Abu Dawud, At-Tirmidhi, Ibn Majah, Al-Hakim, and others, along with the established fact that a slave woman’s waiting period is two menstrual cycles. It is known that slavery affects halving the period, not changing the ruling from purity to menstruation. Since it is established that a slave woman’s waiting period is two menstrual cycles, as stated in the Hadith, and because a single menstrual cycle cannot be divided (otherwise, it would logically be one and a half cycles), it is clear that the waiting period for a free woman is also based on menstruation, not purity. Additionally, Allah’s statement in Surah At-Talaq: And those who no longer expect menstruation among your women, if you doubt, then their waiting period is three months, and [also for] those who have not menstruated [At-Talaq: 4] indicates that menstruation is the intended meaning of qar’ in the previous verse. Furthermore, the Sunnah-compliant divorce is one pronounced during purity. If the waiting period were based on periods of purity, it would lead to either an increase or decrease from three, as the period of purity in which the divorce occurs would either be counted or not. If not counted, it exceeds three; if counted, it falls short. In summary, interpreting qar’ as purity would nullify the specific requirement of three, unlike interpreting it as menstruation, where a divorce in purity is followed by three menstrual cycles, completed when the third menstruation’s blood ceases. If you say: The Hanafis also face an increase or decrease if the divorce occurs during menstruation, nullifying the fixed number. I say: Divorce during menstruation is an irregular divorce, and the Shariah explains the rulings for legislated matters, not unlegislated ones. The verse refers to the waiting period of a legitimate divorce, where no increase or decrease occurs, even if one occurs in an irregular divorce. If qar’ were interpreted as purity, an increase or decrease would occur in a legitimate divorce. It cannot be said that the plural term can apply to two and part of a third, as in Allah’s statement: Hajj is [during] well-known months [Al-Baqarah: 197], because we say: That applies to a plural without a number, but when a number is paired with a plural, it does not. Additionally, quru’ is a plural, and the minimum plural is three, which only holds if qar’ is menstruation. Moreover, this is the view of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the just companions, and the prominent companions, making it more worthy of acceptance than the views of lesser companions. Ash-Shafi’i’s reliance on the masculine form of “three” is not valid, as qar’ is masculine, so it is referenced accordingly. When a thing has both masculine and feminine names, like wheat, it can be referred to in either form. [Umdat Ar-Ri’ayah, At-Ta’liq Al-Mumajjad, and Sharh Al-Kanz by Al-Ayni, excerpted from them]

(1) The statement: He said, "This is a woman whose inheritance Allah has preserved for you, so take it": Know that Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) issued a fatwa in a similar case, as narrated by Malik, that she waits nine months, then observes a waiting period of three months. Malik followed Umar’s view, and Ash-Shafi’i (may Allah be pleased with him) initially followed this in his old opinion, then retracted in his new opinion to follow Ibn Mas’ud’s view, which comes later. He interpreted Umar’s statement as possibly applying to a woman who reached the age at which women typically cease menstruation, so it does not contradict Ibn Mas’ud’s view, and this is our perspective. Know that Ibn Mas’ud (may Allah be pleased with him) issued a fatwa, as narrated by Muhammad and Al-Bayhaqi, that the waiting period is not completed even after eighteen months from the divorce if she does not menstruate. Abu Hanifah and most of our jurists adopted Ibn Mas’ud’s fatwa due to its preference, as the waiting period mentioned in Allah’s Book is of four types for four categories: First, the waiting period for a pregnant woman, whether divorced or widowed, which is delivery, as in Allah’s statement: And for those who are pregnant, their term is until they give birth [At-Talaq: 4]. Second, the waiting period for a postmenopausal woman whose menstruation has ceased due to age. Third, the waiting period for a young girl who has not reached the age of menstruation, which is three months, as in Allah’s statement: And those who no longer expect menstruation among your women, if you doubt, then their waiting period is three months, and [also for] those who have not menstruated [At-Talaq: 4]. Fourth, the waiting period for a divorced woman who menstruates, which is three quru’, as in Allah’s statement: And divorced women shall wait for three quru’ [Al-Baqarah: 228], and these are all for divorced women. A fifth aspect is the waiting period for a non-pregnant woman whose husband has passed away, as in Allah’s statement: And those who die among you and leave wives behind, they [the wives] shall wait four months and ten days [Al-Baqarah: 234]. Umar’s fatwa for a divorced woman whose menstruation ceased after one or two cycles, to wait nine months and then observe three months, does not align with the waiting period of a menstruating woman or others. Thus, the correct view is that of Ibn Mas’ud, as Abu Hanifah stated, meaning she is not permissible until three quru’ pass or she reaches the age of menopause, then observes three months. [At-Ta’liq Al-Mumajjad, Al-Musawwa, and Sunan Al-Bayhaqi, excerpted from them] It is stated in Ad-Durr Al-Mukhtar and Radd Al-Muhtar: As for a young woman observing her waiting period by purity, if she menstruates and then her purity extends, she observes the waiting period by menstruation until she reaches the age of menopause. [Jawhara and others] In Sharh Al-Wahbaniyyah: Her waiting period is completed with nine months—six for menopause and three for the waiting period. I saw in the handwriting of our Shaykh As-Sayhani that the relied-upon view among the Malikis is that the waiting period requires a full year: nine months for menopause and three months for the waiting period. This is strange and contradicts all narrations, so it is not to be followed. In Nikah Al-Khulasah, if a Hanafi is asked about Ash-Shafi’i’s view on a matter, he must say: Abu Hanifah said such-and-such. However, if a Maliki judge rules by it, it is valid, as he is a mujtahid in it. The scholar stated that the fatwa in our time follows Malik’s view. In Jami’ Al-Fusulayn: If a judge rules that her waiting period ends after nine months, it is valid, as the relied-upon view is that a judge’s ruling is only valid according to his madhhab, especially for judges of our time. As for a woman with prolonged purity, the fatwa—as stated in Hidayat Al-Fath—is to estimate her purity as two months, so six months for periods of purity and three menstrual cycles as one month for precaution.